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0.   Introduction 
 
  The Doha Development Round (DDR) negotiations of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) were begun in Qatar in 2001 for the purpose of moving forward the liberalization of global 
trading rules agreed to under the Uruguay Round. As evidenced in the naming of the negotiating 
round, an explicit objective of the DDR trade reform process is the achievement of liberalization 
that will have significant impact on development and growth in the lowest income countries in the 
world.  The Doha era of WTO negotiations has been most notable for its lack of significant 
progress toward agreement since talks began in Qatar. Movement in the negotiations has more 
frequently approached total breakdown than breakthrough. Certainly, a major contribution to the 
failure to advance the negotiations has been dissatisfaction with 1995’s Uruguay Round outcomes 
which produced only limited movement in trade barriers and a belief held by many that the Doha 
disciplines must be aggressive to be meaningful. The economics profession has been fully on board, 
continually forecasting outcomes of aggressive Doha scenarios that generate a host of economic 
benefits for parties in the negotiations. Often these analyses are conducted and presented without 
accounting for or mention of the political economic environment in which negotiations take place.  
 
  Studies which delve into the within country distributional consequences (Hertel et al. 2007, 
2009) have necessarily been more cognizant of the political realities of selling a negotiation outcome 
that leaves influential domestic groups behind post-reform and are less sanguine about the 
obviousness of advantage of particular countries participating in aggressive reform deals. While 
these distributional analyses give us a glimpse of how trade negotiators might be constrained 
politically at home, they cannot tell the whole story. WTO disciplines apply to trade and domestic 
support policies only, one can imagine a variety of domestic initiatives geared toward redistribution 
to make WTO reforms more palatable. Thus, a likely additional factor is the distribution of cross-
national outcomes (relative winners and losers) serving as an impediment in the negotiations. The 
majority (60%) of global inequality (Gini = 53.8) arises from differences in income across countries 
(Bourgignon, Levin, and Rosenblatt 2008). Due to this, participants in the negotiations may be 
equally or more concerned with how the country appears to have fared in the new agreement 
relative to other parties at the negotiating table.   
 
  In this study, we focus on the political realities of the WTO’s negotiating framework, using a 
CGE model and its accounting of the changes in post-reform national income to examine the cross-
country distributional impacts of liberalization. Remaining sections in the paper: (1) discuss cross-
country inequality and studies of Doha outcomes, (2) outline the modeling approach, (3) present 




  Studies of possible Doha outcomes have been in high demand as negotiations continue. 
Analytical capacity is considerably larger than it was during the Uruguay Round era and has resulted 
in a proliferation of available comparisons of alternative scenarios for policy makers to work with as 
they form positions in the negotiations. Academic efforts aimed at study of Doha possibilities have 
contributed to the discourse with a general objective of identifying domains of protection most in 
need of reform. These studies tend to use computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to show a 
strong preference for broad participation across countries (developed to least developed) and 
establish the priority position of improved market access (tariff reduction) (Hoekman, Ng, and 
Olarreaga 2004; Anderson and Valenzuela 2007). Furthermore, these studies show that the national 
level benefits on the whole are positive for all groups of countries generating positive welfare 
outcomes as distortions are removed. 
 
2. Modeling  Approach 
 
  We take the GTAP version 7 database and CGE model as our starting point for analysis. 
Fully disaggregated, the database/model specifies 113 distinct regions each with a representative 
household who owns factors of production which it supplies to a complement of perfectly 
competitive firms. Using this database and model allows us to evaluate distributional outcomes in a 
modeling environment commonly used for assessing welfare outcomes of trade liberalization 
scenarios. In particular model estimates of Doha round outcomes have relied heavily on this 
database for projecting the potential gains of alternative reform scenarios in agriculture and 
manufacturing trade. Because our primary interest is in examining the cross-country income 
distribution when liberalizing reforms are enacted, we leave the database fully disaggregated with  
respect to regions in the model such that all 113 countries and country groupings of the GTAP 
database are represented in the model. In terms of sectors, we aggregate GTAP’s fifty-seven sectors 
to a group of ten, indicated in table COMM. 
 
Table COMM. Aggregate Tradable Commodities in the Model 
Short Name  Description 
GrainsCrops Farm  level  grain and crop products 
MeatLstk  Farm level meat and livestock products 
Extraction Other  primary production/extraction 
ProcFood  Processed food products 
TextWapp Textiles  and wearing apparel 
LightMnfc  Lightweight manufactured goods 
HeavyMnfc  Heavy manufactured goods 
Util_Cons  Utility and construction services 
TransComm Transportation  and communication services 
OthServices Other  services 
  
  The empirical modeling literature addressing the Doha negotiations has considered a 
multitude of partial reform scenarios. Rather than adopting one of these, we opt to consider full 
reform of non-agricultural merchandise tariffs, as well as the three pillars of agricultural support and 
protection. Initial protection levels in the GTAP database are sourced from a variety of data outlets 
as documented in Narayanan and Walmsley (2008). We summarize the initial levels of border 
protection in table TARIFFS, using the trade weighted average ad valorem tariff rate for agricultural 
and non-agricultural tariffs for three classes of countries organized by their average per capita 
income. 
 
  The first section of table TARIFFS summarizes agricultural tariffs. Here we see that the 
highest tariffs imposed are by low income countries, and in particular agricultural imports from 
other low income countries. This tendency toward high south-south protection has been analyzed 
elsewhere and shown to be a large potential source of welfare improvement for the poorest nations  
of the world (Hertel, Keeney, Ivanic, and Winters 2007). Of particular note regarding south-south 
protection is the fact that most negotiating frameworks call for only minimal tariff reform by the 
world’s poorest countries. On the other hand, high income countries have the lowest average tariff 
rates though the impact of this protection is also influenced by the significantly large volume of 
imports these countries bring in country.  
 











High Income  6.76 11.22 13.58
Middle Income  13.39 10.62 15.57
Low Income  10.82 12.84 20.18
Non-Agricultural Tariffs 
High Income  1.06 5.69 8.06
Middle Income  0.93 3.73 6.22
Low Income  3.18 8.55 9.13
All Tariffs Combined 
High Income  1.51 6.08 8.34
Middle Income  2.27 4.70 7.68
Low Income  3.71 9.04 10.58
 
Proportion of Non-zero Tariffs  0.57 0.75 0.67
 
 
  The pattern of non-agricultural tariffs is very similar to that for agriculture, though the rates 
are much smaller tending towards less than half the rates for agriculture. The large number of tariff 
lines in non-agricultural merchandise masks considerable protection that exists at the tariff line as 
protection is often tailored to quite specific products that show large tariff peaks. We get some idea 
of the wide variability in tariff based protection from the last row in table TARIFFS where we see 
that between forty and sixty percent of aggregate sector tariffs in the data are actually zero 
depending on the particular regional grouping. In addition to tariffs, we model the removal of 
domestic subsidies in OECD countries (where producer support estimates are used as source data 
for ad valorem subsidy equivalents) and export subsidies for agriculture. 
  
  WTO trade reform in non-agriculture and the three agricultural pillars represent the only 
perturbations to the model we introduce. The GTAP model we use is comparative static which 
limits our analysis of cross-country distribution to the equilibrium market exchange effects that 
follow changes in protection. The dynamic effects of aggressive trade reform which affect industry 
growth and international investment patterns are ignored here and represent an important limitation 
of our analysis of distributional impacts. 
 
  We use per capita GDP for all countries as our measure of income, consistent with previous 
analyses of the cross-country dimension of global income distribution. The plot of gross domestic 
product per capita as measured in the GTAP database for all 113 countries are given in figure DIST. 
We see the dramatic differences in average income across countries that exists here with a number 
of moderately populated countries/regions with very high incomes and a large number of countries 
(and global population) at the bottom of the scale with very low average income. Of course the large 
gaps between wealthy and poorest nations means that changes in inequality arising from equilibrium 
adjustment to reduced tariffs will be small since the benefits are shared over a large number of 
trading nations. Thus, our particular interest will be on the relative inequality impacts of categories 
of reform such that we can provide some analytical guidance on which areas of the Doha 
negotiations have the largest impact on cross-country inequality. This insight will then be 
complementary to the studies reviewed in section 1 which discussed analysis of reforms measures 




  Our reporting of results are focused squarely on the per capita GDP results and how global 
income is distributed on average across countries. Table GDPDELSTATS reports a measure of the 
GDP change following full liberalization of all instruments. The GDP change results are 
decomposed into twenty component changes, related to the type of instrument and labeled using the 
following nomenclature. The first letter indicates the type of protection intervention (T = tariff, X = 
export subsidy, S = producer subsidy). The second letter indicates the aggregate sector involved (A 
= agriculture, N = non-agriculture). The final two letters indicate the exporter (3
rd letter) and 
importer (4
th letter) with the following designations (H = high income country, M = middle income 
country, L = low income country, and * = all countries). Thus, the first row (TAHH) of the table  
indicates the average percentage change in GDP resulting from tariffs applied to agriculture on trade 
from high income countries to high income countries. The columns of the table indicate the 
category of country according to the three levels of income we use to summarize average effects. 
 
Table GDPDELSTATS. Sign Consistency of % Change in GDP by Income Class 
 
Instrument  High Income  Middle Income  Low Income 
TAHH -0.02  -1.00 -1.00
TAMH -0.06  1.00 -0.47
TALH -0.99  -0.92 1.00
TNHH -0.63  -1.00 -1.00
TNMH -0.96  1.00 -0.63
TNLH -0.99  -0.97 0.93
TAHM 0.99  -1.00 -1.00
TAMM -0.99  0.20 -1.00
TALM -1.00  -1.00 1.00
TNHM 0.56  -0.97 -1.00
TNMM -0.92  1.00 -0.81
TNLM -0.90  0.20 0.83
TAHL 1.00  -1.00 -1.00
TAML -0.86  0.98 -0.98
TALL -0.91  -1.00 0.52
TNHL 0.63  -1.00 -1.00
TNML -0.85  1.00 -1.00
TNLL -0.99  -0.88 0.68
XAH* 0.07  -0.25 -0.99
SAH* 1.00  1.00 1.00
Total -0.69  0.54 0.00
 
  The values in table GDPDELSTATS are not actual percentage changes, rather they are a 
measure of sign and consistency of the effect across the broad group of countries within an income 
class. The values are the average percentage change divided by the average absolute value of the 
percentage change both for the value of GDP. This sign consistency measure clearly will range 
between value of negative and positive one, with a value of negative one meaning that a particular 
instrument uniformly reduces GDP for countries in the category while a positive one indicates all 
countries in the group realize a positive GDP effect of liberalizing a particular instrument. In terms 
of analyzing and predicting the impact of a particular instrument on inequality, we will want to pay 
particular attention to those instruments which evidence values at or near the extremes of the sign 
consistency statistic, indicating a uniform effect for a particular group of countries and indicating  
that all countries in the same neighborhood of the income distribution move in a consistent 
direction within that distribution following the shock. 
 
  The results in table GDPDELSTATS can thus be used to provide a cursory analysis of the 
impacts of different instruments’ impact on inequality by evaluating policy reforms that increase 
GDP for the lowest income countries while reducing it for those with higher incomes. In particular, 
a value of 1.00 for the low income grouping and -1.00 for both the middle income and high income 
countries would strongly indicate a reduction in inequality across countries. This is exactly the case 
that we observe for the instrument TALM (tariffs on agriculture placed on low income countries’ 
exports by middle income countries). The SC statistic we report in table GDPDELSTATS does not 
have any information on magnitudes of effects, so we cannot assert directly that this measure is 
inequality reducing (all of the changes could be very small or the wealthiest countries in the low 
income grouping could disproportionately enjoy the GDP increases). That said, the measures give us 
a strong indication of the relative uniformity of benefits and costs of reforms in a manner that is 
consistent with how the negotiations are enacted (i.e. agriculture vs. non-agriculture or industrial vs. 
developing vs. least developed economies). 
 
Figure GRAPHSC. Comparison of Instruments’ Uniformity of Impact on Value of GDP 



















  To further develop this analysis using the sign consistency statistic in accord with comparing 
the potential distributional impacts, we can subtract from the SC of the low income countries the SC 
of both of the higher income groups. Thus, a value of 3 would be the maximum (+1 for low 
income, and -1 for the two higher income groups) and the descending order would give us a means 
of ranking instruments as to their inequality friendliness. Figure GRAPHSC presents this ranking for 
instruments and we see that six of the values for this addition of SC’s are over a value of 1.5. These 
are split evenly among importers with each of the country groupings having two measures in the > 
1.5 range and all six of them related to low income country exports. Thus, our approach to 
evaluating inequality reducing impacts is able to identify market access concessions in agriculture and 
non-agriculture as the most important reforms in terms of reducing inequality. Moreover, we see 
that agricultural market access in middle and high income countries rank the highest in terms of 
having the broadest (across low income countries) uniform impact in reducing inequality. 
 
Table INEQDEL. Changes in Inequality by Instrument 
 
Instrument Gini Theil  Summary 
T A H H  -0.000413 -0.000600 Neg 
T A M H  -0.004105 -0.016766 Neg 
T A L H  -0.003185 -0.007420 Neg 
T N H H  0.051500 0.040629 Pos 
T N M H  0.002500 0.005287 Pos 
T N L H  -0.001976 -0.004292 Neg 
T A H M  0.001897 0.005977 Pos 
T A M M  -0.000172 -0.001246 Neg 
T A L M  -0.000893 -0.001272 Neg 
T N H M  0.002872 0.010225 Pos 
T N M M  -0.001289 -0.005565 Neg 
T N L M  -0.000687 -0.001147 Neg 
T A H L  0.001870 0.004669 Pos 
T A M L  0.000543 0.000412 Pos 
T A L L  -0.000690 -0.001264 Neg 
T N H L  0.002524 0.007545 Pos 
T N M L  -0.002343 -0.008854 Neg 
T N L L  -0.001663 -0.003656 Neg 
X A H *  -0.000039 -0.000116 Neg 
S A H *  -0.000345 -0.000699 Neg 
 
  The virtue of examining the uniformity of per capita GDP changes in neighborhoods of the 
distribution lies in the fact that we are do not restrict ourselves to a particular set of restrictions  
associated with an inequality measure. The literature on inequality measures contains considerable 
debates on appropriateness of measures and how they relate to social welfare or preferences, thus 
compounding the debate over reform instruments with additional complexity of inequality 
measurement. That said, our analysis would be incomplete without some accounting for the 
magnitudes involved which are critical in determining improvements in inequality. In table 
INEQDEL, we report two measures of inequality changes, the Gini and Theil indices. We again 
report these by liberalizing instrument and focus on the sign change of inequality.  
 
  We first note that the predicted changes in inequality are all in agreement between the Theil 
and Gini indices for each instrument and that as previously discussed the predicted changes are very 
small. In terms of instruments and their predicted impacts, we see that reform of 11 tariff types as 
well as high income countries’ domestic agriculture and export subsidies are inequality reducing. 
Notably, both forms of south-south (**LL) liberalization are inequality reducing. Among the seven 
inequality increasing instruments using the Gini or Theil measure, we see that agricultural tariff 
reform imposed against high and middle income countries by low income countries will worsen 
inequality. Thus, when magnitudes of changes are considered, the gains from these reforms 
disproportionately benefit the high income country group for a variety of reasons related to 
adjustments in the bilateral trading patterns that exist under status quo and full reform protection. 
 
  We place the Gini changes from table INEQDEL on a relative (to the total inequality 
change) basis and plot these in figure INEQREL. Focusing on the left-hand side (inequality 
reducing) of the graph, we see that agricultural tariff reform by high income countries on imports 
from middle and low income countries yield the strongest negative movement in measured 
Lorenzean inequality. Following these, tariff reform in low income countries on non-agricultural 
imports from middle and low income countries’ exports have strongest relative impacts. Notable in 
the inequality measure analysis is that the Gini like other measures of inequality does not favor 
movements at the low end of the income distribution such that if middle income countries increase 
their income relative to the highest income countries this can lead to a large measure of inequality 
reduction, even if it is not so consistent with Doha objectives that might concern global income 
inequality. Finally, we note that both elimination of agricultural production and export subsidies are 
inequality reducing but have only small impacts relative to border measures. 
  
 
Figure INEQREL. Comparison of Relative Contributions to Inequality Reduction 
 
  In comparison to our measures of the summation of SC’s which focused on inequality 
relative to the low income countries, we see that the four largest relative inequality impacts have 
different effects for the low income countries. While TAMH reform has the largest Lorenzean 
inequality reducing effect, it is the least inequality friendly measure in figure GRAPHSC indicating it 
has a low likelihood of improving inequality for the lowest income countries. Thus, the two 
frameworks of analysis are complementary in identifying both a general (Gini) and local (SC) 
dimension of inequality reduction. 
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
 
  This study reports the outcomes of a full reform experiment consistent with liberalizing 
global trade in a WTO/Doha type framework. Our approach to assessing inequality expands on 
traditional measures which are confounded by the need to evaluate the entire cross-country 
distribution. In fact, we complement such a measure by using a sign consistency measure over 
income groupings, to locate potential for inequality improvement in a neighborhood of the 
distribution. In general, we conclude (in accord with previous welfare focused studies) that market 












































access is the much more important for generating benefits for least developed/low income 
countries. Further, we find that allowing free market access to low income country imports has the 
greatest potential benefit for reducing inequality located at the bottom of the cross-country income 
distribution. 
 
  Further work in this area extends naturally into the determinants of GDP, as calculated 
within the CGE model solution. Since GDP is a real value term, it can be decomposed into its real 
price and quantity components to explore additional cross-country determinants to the comparative 
static predictions of post-reform equilibrium, and provide further analytical insight into the potential 
income redistribution impacts of reducing trade barriers. 
 
   
References 
Anderson, K., and E. Valenzuela. 2007. “Do Global Trade Distortions Still Harm Developing 
Country Farmers?” Review of World Economics 143(1): 108-139. 
 
Bourguignon, F., V. Levin, and D. Rosenblatt. 2009. “International Redistribution of Income.” 
World Development 37(1): 1-10. 
 
Hertel, T.W., R. Keeney, M. Ivanic, and L.A. Winters. 2009. “Why Isn’t the Doha Development 
Agenda More Poverty Friendly?” Review of Development Economics (in press). 
 
Hertel, T.W., R. Keeney, M. Ivanic, and L.A. Winters. 2007. “Distributional Effects of WTO 
Agricultural Reforms in Rich and Poor Countries,” Economic Policy 50: 289-337. 
 
Hoekman, B., F. Ng, and M. Olarreaga. 2004. “Agricultural Tariffs or Subsidies: Which Are More 
Important for Developing Economies?” World Bank Economic Review 18(2): 175-204. 
 
Narayanan, B.G., and T.L. Walmsley. 2008. Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 7 Data 
Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University. 
   
 
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
D
I
S
T
.
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
s
 
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
6
1
 
L
U
X
7
2
 
N
O
R
7
1
 
C
H
E
7
3
 
X
E
F
2
8
 
X
N
A
5
0
 
D
N
K
5
7
 
I
R
L
2
6
 
U
S
A
6
9
 
S
W
E
6
 
J
P
N
4
6
 
A
U
T
7
0
 
G
B
R
6
3
 
N
L
D
5
2
 
F
I
N
5
3
 
F
R
A
4
7
 
B
E
L
5
4
 
D
E
U
1
 
A
U
S
2
5
 
C
A
N
5
8
 
I
T
A
1
6
 
S
G
P
6
8
 
E
S
P
2
 
N
Z
L
5
 
H
K
G
4
8
 
C
Y
P
5
5
 
G
R
C
6
7
 
S
V
N
6
5
 
P
R
T
7
 
K
O
R
8
 
T
W
N
6
2
 
M
L
T
4
9
 
C
Z
E
5
6
 
H
U
N
6
6
 
S
V
K
5
1
 
E
S
T
7
7
 
H
R
V
2
7
 
M
E
X
6
0
 
L
T
U
6
4
 
P
O
L
9
1
 
X
W
S
5
9
 
L
V
A
3
2
 
C
H
L
4
5
 
X
C
B
1
1
1
 
B
W
A
1
0
4
 
M
U
S
1
4
 
M
Y
S
4
0
 
C
R
I
1
1
2
 
Z
A
F
1
9
 
X
S
E
3
8
 
V
E
N
9
0
 
T
U
R
3
7
 
U
R
Y
4
3
 
P
A
N
7
9
 
R
U
S
2
9
 
A
R
G
7
8
 
R
O
U
3
1
 
B
R
A
7
5
 
B
G
R
8
2
 
X
E
R
8
3
 
K
A
Z
9
5
 
X
N
F
7
4
 
A
L
B
9
4
 
T
U
N
1
7
 
T
H
A
3
9
 
X
S
M
3
6
 
P
E
R
3
 
X
O
C
3
4
 
E
C
U
8
9
 
I
R
N
7
6
 
B
L
R
4
1
 
G
T
M
3
3
 
C
O
L
1
1
3
 
X
S
C
4
4
 
X
C
A
9
3
 
M
A
R
3
5
 
P
R
Y
8
0
 
U
K
R
4
 
C
H
N
1
1
 
I
D
N
8
6
 
A
R
M
9
9
 
X
C
F
9
2
 
E
G
Y
8
7
 
A
Z
E
1
5
 
P
H
L
9
 
X
E
A
8
8
 
G
E
O
2
3
 
L
K
A
3
0
 
B
O
L
4
2
 
N
I
C
9
7
 
S
E
N
8
1
 
X
E
E
2
2
 
P
A
K
2
1
 
I
N
D
8
5
 
X
S
U
9
6
 
N
G
A
1
8
 
V
N
M
1
1
0
 
X
E
C
1
0
8
 
Z
M
B
9
8
 
X
W
F
8
4
 
K
G
Z
1
2
 
L
A
O
2
0
 
B
G
D
1
0
 
K
H
M
1
0
0
 
X
A
C
1
0
9
 
Z
W
E
1
0
5
 
M
O
Z
1
0
6
 
T
Z
A
1
0
7
 
U
G
A
2
4
 
X
S
A
1
0
2
 
M
D
G
1
3
 
M
M
R
1
0
3
 
M
W
I
1
0
1
 
E
T
H
G
D
P
p
c
G
D
P
p
c